Commons no Governance (Governing the Commons - The evolution of institutions for collective action)

This book is a translation of the principal work by Elinor Ostrom (1933–2012), recipient of the 2009 Nobel Prize in Economics. A political scientist by specialty, the author focused on the processes of institutional formation and transformation, energetically researching the social mechanisms enabling the sustainable management of commons—particularly natural resources—used collectively by people. Furthermore, Ostrom led research groups involving scholars from diverse backgrounds, including anthropology, economics, and area studies. This book is a “progress report” (Preface p. vii) she compiled during the midst of this vigorous research activity.

Traditional understanding held that in commons, everyone behaves so as to gain more benefit, leading to unrestricted resource consumption and eventual collapse. Based on this perception, two prescriptions have been offered for effectively managing commons: either entrusting control to government regulation or dividing the commons and leaving management to the rational actions of individuals. In other words, the “people” who have used the commons on the ground have been dismissed as incapable of managing them. In contrast, the greatest significance of this book lies in demonstrating that “people” can indeed manage commons sustainably over the long term.
 
Chapter 1 clarifies the book's central challenge by critically examining relevant academic history and theories. To summarize the author's position, the book demonstrates the necessity of inductive argumentation based on empirical cases, as opposed to deductive approaches that prove propositions a priori. Although not extensively covered, it is important that the book points out the detrimental effects of policies such as forest nationalization, which were implemented relying on deductive arguments. Chapter 2 then presents the book's conceptual definitions and analytical framework. It identifies three core problems for analyzing case studies: The supply problem (how rules and institutions are provided when “people” take charge of managing commons themselves), the commitment problem (how people behave under these rules and institutions), and the mutual surveillance problem (how compliance with rules is ensured).
 
Chapters 3 through 5 place numerous case studies under scrutiny, developing detailed analyses. The commons examined are remarkably diverse: pastures, forests, irrigation water, groundwater, and coastal fisheries. Chapter 3 analyzes what could be termed successful cases, representing a highlight of the book. Here, the author presents the design principles for sustainable commons management, frequently cited as a key contribution. It is also worth noting that this chapter includes a case study from Japan; the common land at the base of Mount Fuji. The examination of so-called failure cases in Chapter 5 is equally important, as it validates the design principles presented in Chapter 3.
 
Building on these case analyses, Chapter 6 synthesizes responses to the three problems mentioned above and proposes an analytical framework focusing on the costs incurred during the process of institutional generation and transformation.
 
The original book was published in 1990, and commons research has since developed remarkably. However, the book's value as a source providing fundamental perspectives for understanding commons remains undiminished.
 

(Written by SAITO Haruo, Lecturer, Graduate School of Agricultural and Life Sciences / 2025)